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Abstract 
In this study, we seek to better understand the interest rate pass-through 
in five Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the CEE-5. Our pass-through 
estimates for several retail rates are generally lower than those reported 
in the literature, given the absence of cointegration between policy rates 
and long- or even short-term market rates. In addition, the pass-through 
has been declining over time in the CEE-5, and we argue that it is likely 
to decrease further in the future. Finally, the pass-through appears 
similar in the CEE-5 than in Spain and is higher than in core euro area 
countries. Hence, euro adoption by the CEE-5 would not further increase 
heterogeneity within the euro area with regard to the interest rate pass-
through. However, substantially more research is needed to establish 
commonalities and differences between the CEE-5 and the euro area 
with respect to the reaction of prices and output to monetary policy 
action. 
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1 Introduction 
In order to ensure price stability, it is essential for central banks to have a genuine and precise 
understanding of how fast and to what extent a change in their interest instrument modifies 
inflation. In particular, it is crucial to assess whether or not the pass-through from monetary 
policy rates to long-term market and retail rates is complete, as this is the first building block 
for the monetary transmission mechanism. If the interest rate pass-through is not complete, 
the impact of monetary policy actions through the credit, interest rate or exchange rate 
channels will be considerably attenuated. Against this backdrop, a large amount of research 
has been dedicated to the interest rate pass-through in industrialized countries: it is generally 
found to be incomplete and to react sluggishly to changes in the policy rate
1. 
The interest rate pass-through is of particular interest in transition economies because retail 
rates started to be governed by market forces only after the introduction of two-tier banking 
systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s and became increasingly market driven with 
advances in financial market reforms. As a consequence, and not surprisingly, the pass-
through in those economies is generally found to become stronger over time
2. In this paper, 
we contribute to this subject for the CEE-5 by not only looking at the relationship between 
monetary policy rate, on the one hand, and market and retail rates
3, on the other hand, but also 
by studying the whole chain of transmission running from the policy rate via market rates to 
bank retail (deposit and lending) rates in a multivariate Vector Autoregression (VAR) setting. 
Our results indicate that the interest rate pass-through is generally lower in transition 
economies than suggested by previous research. Yet it is higher than in core euro area 
countries (such as Austria and Germany), while being comparable to that observed in 
catching-up euro area countries such as Spain. With a view to the future adoption of the euro 
in the CEE-5, this finding has important implications: the euro area would not grow more 
inhomogeneous with respect to the monetary transmission mechanism. This is backed by the 
finding that the interest rate pass-through has been declining over time and - as we argue -  is 
likely to continue to do so in the future.  
                                            
1See e.g. DeBondt (2005) and Sander and Kleimeier (2004a) for euro area results. 
2See e.g. Horváth, Krekó and Naszódi (2004) for Hungary; Opiela (1999), Chmielewski (2003) and Wróbel and 
Pawlowska (2002) for Poland; Crespo-Cuaresma, Égert and Reininger (2004), Sander and Kleimeier (2004b) 
and Tieman (2004) for a number of CEE countries. 
3 We try to answer the questions whether pass-through from the monetary policy rate via market rates to retail 
rates is complete in the long-run, whether the pass-through is different in different segments of the same 
economy (households vs. non-financial corporate sector or short term vs. long term), whether there evidence of 
convergence/divergence across countries and over time and whether the direction of a change in the monetary 
policy rate (increase or decrease) have an impact on the short-term adjustment?   3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 deals with theoretical and 
empirical issues related to the interest rate pass-through. Section 3 describes the dataset, 
Section 4 outlines the estimation techniques and Section 5 presents the results and compares 
them with those reported in earlier studies. Section 6 analyzes possible future changes in the 
pass-through. Finally, Section 7 gives some concluding remarks and draws policy 
conclusions. 
2 Interest Rate Pass-Through 
2.1 The Two Stages 
The interest rate pass-through can be decomposed into two stages. The first stage measures 
how changes in the monetary policy rate are transmitted to short- and long-term market rates, 
while the second stage describes how changes in the market rates influence bank deposit and 
lending rates. 
The first stage is to a large extent influenced by the stability of the yield curve: If the term 
structure, whatever its form may be (negative or positive sloping), remains stable over time, 
the pass-through from policy rates to market rates is said to be proportionate.
4 However, any 
twist in the yield curve can change the size of the pass-through.
5 
The cost of funds approach (DeBondt, 2005) is the best way to describe the second stage of 
the interest rate pass-through, i.e. the connection between market rates on the one hand, and 
bank deposit and lending rates of comparable maturity on the other hand. 
In general, several factors make sure that market rates are passed onto retail rates. For loan 
rates, the link to market rates is secured by the fact that banks rely on the money market to 
fund (short-term) lending. This is in the same vein that deposit rates, which represent the cost 
of loans, should be reflected in loan rates.
6 At the same time, yields on government securities 
can be viewed as opportunity costs for banks. This helps maintain the link between, for 
instance, government bond yields and loan rates of longer maturity.  
The connection between market rates and deposit rates is warranted by the possibility that 
households and the non-financial corporate sector can hold their financial assets not only in 
                                            
4 In this case, changes in the policy rate will lead to a shift in the yield curve. 
5 The form of the yield curve may be determined by four factors: a.) a liquidity premium implies for long-term 
rates. b.) Second, market segmentation of short-term and long-term interest rates. c.) expectation: long-term 
interest rates can be computed as the average of expected future short-term interest rates d.) expectations of 
future exchange rate, in particular with strong participation of foreign portfolio investors varying across the 
maturity segments. 
6Provided that the volatility of the credit risk premium embedded in loan rates is stable over time.   4
bank deposits, but also in government securities of comparable maturity. In addition, banks 
can rely on the money market instead of deposits for funding loans, which can also lead to an 
equalization of deposit and money market rates. 
The assumption of a stable yield curve makes it possible to take a shortcut by looking directly 
at the relationship between policy rates and retail (deposit and loan) rates. This approach is 
referred to as the monetary policy approach (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a). 
The alternative transmission routes from policy rates to retail rates and the ensuing 
empirically testable relationships are shown in table 1 below. 
Table 1: Testable Relationships 
Monetary Policy Approach       
Policy rate → short-term/long-term deposit rate 
Policy rate → short-term/long-term lending rate 
Cost of Funds Approach       
1
st stage: yield curve      
   policy rate → 1m MMR → 12m MMR/T-bill rate → G-bond rate 
2
nd stage: cost of funds      
   a) 1m MMR / 12m T-bill/MMR → short-term deposit rate → short-term loans (long- term loan rate) 
   b) 1m MMR / 12m T-bill/MMR → short-term loan rate (long-term loan rate ) 
   c) GB rate → long-term deposit rate → long-term loan rate 
   d) GB rate → long-term loan rate 
 
 
2.2 Reasons for Incomplete Interest Rate Pass-Through 
The pass-through from market rates to retail rates is, however, not necessarily proportionate. 
If the elasticity of demand for deposits and for loans to the deposit and the lending rate, 
respectively, is lower than 1, the pass-through may become disproportionate. Imperfect 
substitution between bank deposits and other money market instruments of the same maturity 
(e.g. money market funds or T-bills) and between bank lending and other types of external 
finance (equity or bond markets) may cause demand elasticity to be lower than unity. Weak 
competition within the banking sector (i.e. among banks) and in the financial sector (i.e. 
between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) reduces the sensitivity of the demand   5
for deposits and loans to the interest rate.
7 High switching costs may also lead to lower 
demand elasticity.
8 
Macroeconomic conditions influence the size of the pass-through, too. It is generally observed 
that during periods of rapid economic growth, it is easier for banks to pass on changes in the 
interest rate to their lending and deposit rates faster. Higher inflation rates also favor more 
complete and more rapid interest rate pass-through, given that prices may be adjusted more 
frequently in a double-digit or high inflation environment. By contrast, higher interest rate 
volatility (mirroring higher macroeconomic instability and uncertainty) weakens the interest 
rate pass-through, given that banks wait longer before changing their rates. 
The pass-through can be not only incomplete in the long run, but also sluggish in the short 
run. The reasons for this are manifold: First, adjustment or menu costs can cause banks to 
react sluggishly to changes in the market rates. Second, the maturity mismatch of banks’ loan 
and deposit portfolio influences the way in which they adjusts their lending rates.
9 The more 
long-term loans are covered by long-term deposits, the less pressure banks feel to adjust their 
lending rates, given that their liabilities are less sensitive to market rates (Weth, 2002). 
Finally, given the long-term relationships of banks (especially universal banks) with their 
customers, they may want to smooth interest rate changes. 
4 Estimation Techniques 
4.1 Single Equation Approach 
The empirical literature concerned with analyzing the interest rate pass-through usually relies 
on generalizations of the following bivariate error correction model: 
t
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where 
R
t i  and 
P
t i  are the retail (or market) rate and the monetary policy rate, respectively. β  
stands for the long-run pass-through. Instead of a simple OLS, we use two alternative 
                                            
7The competition effect is more important for deposit rates than for lending rates, given that the former are less 
affected by asymmetric information problems (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a). 
8 The pass-through can also be amplified , i.e. be higher than unity, if banks charge higher interest rates in an 
attempt to offset the higher risks resulting from asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) 
rather than reducing the supply of loans (DeBondt, 2005). An increase in the general interest rate level raises the 
average burden of interest payments and thus necessitates an upward adjustment of the risk premium for 
asymmetric information. The same argument applies to small banks: they find it more difficult to obtain external 
financing owing to asymmetric information problems. This is why they have to pay a risk premium on their 
deposit rates to attract sufficient amounts of deposits; consequently, they also require a premium on their lending 
rates (Gambacorta, 2004). 
9Note that maturity in this context refers to the period of interest rate fixation (i.e. the interval between the 
adjustment dates of interest rates of a loan or deposit contract), not to the duration of the loan or deposit contract 
between initial payment and full repayment.   6
methods to estimate β : 1.) Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) as proposed by Stock 
and Watson (1993), which accounts for the potential endogeneity of the monetary policy rate 
by incorporating leads and lags in first differences of the regressor. 2.) A standard ARDL 
model as suggested by Wickens and Breusch (1988).  
We assess the existence of cointegration of the monetary policy rate (
P i ) with retail rates (
R i ) 
by relying either on residual-based cointegration tests for DOLS (Engle and Granger, 1987) 
and on the bounds testing approach (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001) for the error correction 
representation of the ARDL model. 
We also look at the issue of asymmetry in the pass-through. One can hypothesize that a) the 
speed of adjustment (ρ ) to the long-run relationship and b) the short-term dynamics are 
different depending on whether the monetary policy rate increases or decreases, which leads 
to the following specification: 
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where  ) (• I  is an indicator function taking value 1 if the argument is true and zero otherwise. 
A simple test for symmetry is then given by the F-test for the following 
restrictions: j j j j ζ φ ψ δ ρ ρ = = = ; ; 2 1  for all j. A rejection of the null indicates that there is 
asymmetry in the speed of adjustment and/or in short-term dynamics depending on the 
direction of the change in the policy rate. We test both separately and jointly for the two types 
of asymmetries.
10 
4.2 Multivariate Approach 
The interest rate pass-through can be viewed as a chain of pairwise links: policy rate – 1m 
MMR; 1m MMR – 12m T-bill/MMR rate;12m T-bill/MMR rate – Government bond yield – 
long-term deposit rate – long-term lending rate (see table 1). Using a cointegrated VAR 
framework (Johansen, 1995) makes it possible to analyze the many pairwise relationships in a 
                                            
10Whether the asymmetric behavior of the market rate is attributable to the deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium or to the direction of change in the policy rate depends on the definition of asymmetry one wants to 
test for. In line with the cost of funds approach (DeBondt 2005), we interpret changes in the policy rate as cost 
shocks to private banks. Thus, it is, inter alia, the degree of competition among banks which determines whether 
a change in costs can be passed on to the corresponding price (the retail interest rate) and whether or not that 
response will be symmetric with respect to the direction of the change in the policy rate. The latter (i.e. the 
existence of a negative or positive cost shock) seems to be the relevant variable for this interpretation, since the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium need not be a valid proxy for cost of funds-related shocks.   7
single system. Fully-fledged transmission from policy to retail rates would imply that there 
would be 4 cointegration relationships in the presence of 5 interest rate series, so that  
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In other words, 
P i  would be connected to 
L i  via the four pairwise long-term cointegration 
relationships. However, whether or not there is a proportionate pass-through from 
P i  to 
L i  
largely depends on the size of the long-term beta coefficients 
( 4 3 2 1 β β β β ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = −through pass ). 
In practice, the pass-through may be incomplete in system (3), because the pass-through from 
the long-term market rate to retail rates may be ineffective if the yield curve is not stable 
and/or because the funding of bank lending relies on shorter-term market rates
11 instead of 
bank deposits/long-term market rates. For instance, if we find 3 cointegrating vectors instead 
of the 4 required for full pass-through, we estimate a system in which the following 
cointegrating vectors are assumed ) , ( ); , ( ); , (
L D D MS MS P i i i i i i . If the relationship between 
deposit and lending rates is not robust, we assume that both deposit and lending rates are 
connected to short-term market rates:  ) , ( ); , ( ); , (
L MS D MS MS P i i i i i i . 
5 Results 
5.1 Cointegration Results 
The fact that all interest rate series turn out to be well-represented by I(1) processes for the 
periods under review
12 justifies the use of the cointegration techniques to determine the size 
of, and the mechanism underlying, the interest rate pass-through. 
In a first step, all market and retail interest rate series are regressed on the monetary policy 
rate for the whole period and for two subperiods.
13 The first subperiod ends in 2000:12 and 
                                            
11E.g. as a result of interest rate swaps. 
12Standard unit root and stationarity tests, such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and 
the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) point optimal unit root tests as well as the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) stationarity test, are employed for level data and for first and second differences. While most test 
results show unanimously that the series are I(1) processes, some tests provide conflicting results for level data. 
However, since they never indicate unambiguously that the series are stationary in level, we conclude that these 
series are I(1). The test results are available from the authors upon request.   8
the second subperiod starts in 2001:01
14 The rationale behind splitting the sample into 
subsamples is to check for major changes in the pass-through over time.
15 
We carry out four cointegration tests: two residual-based tests for the OLS/DOLS estimates
16, 
one residual-based test and the bounds testing approach for the long-term relationship 
obtained with the ARDL model. If at least three of the four test statistics support the presence 
of cointegration, we will consider the cointegration between the policy rate and any given 
interest rate series to be robust.
17 
The most remarkable feature of the results is the absence of cointegration for a large number 
of interest rate series. The difficulty of establishing cointegrating relationships is also 
supported by estimation results obtained for the IFS dataset.
18 
Addressing asymmetries in the adjustment to the long-run relationship and in short-run 
dynamics is only meaningful when cointegration is detected. The results summarized in tables 
2a and 2b indicate some common features. First, asymmetry is most often detected for the 1-
month MMR. Second, more asymmetries are observed in the second subperiod. Third, 
asymmetry is usually present both for the adjustment to the long-run relationship and in short-
run dynamics. 
5.2 Size of the Pass-Through 
In the analysis of the size of the interest rate pass-through, we consider the long-run pass-
through coefficient (β ) for cases when cointegration could be established with confidence. In 
                                                                                                                                        
13We use the Schwarz information criterion to select the lag length in the DOLS and ARDL approaches, setting 
the maximum number of lags to 6. 
14We split the sample period in 2000:12 and 2001:01, because interest rate series disaggregated by sectors 
(households, non-financial corporate sector) for the Czech Republic are available from 2001:01. Dividing the 
series at the same point in time for the other countries secures a higher level of cross-country comparability. 
15At first glance, the subperiods might seem too short for cointegration analysis. However, contrary e.g. to 
business cycle analysis (which requires data spanning at least 10 years to cover the whole cycle), interest rate 
data adjustment in the pass-through context tends to take place much faster. We have 50–60 observations for the 
subperiods; from an econometric viewpoint, 100–120 observations would be required. Still, the fact that we 
could not establish cointegration does not necessarily reflect the low power of the tests. Instead, it suggests that 
such cointegrating vectors are actually absent, given that it is sometimes difficult to find cointegration even for 
the whole sample. One may also argue that the non-cointegration finding could be mitigated by the use of 
nonlinear cointegration techniques. However, the term nonlinear cointegration is somewhat misleading given 
that it refers to nonlinear/asymmetric short-term adjustments rather than to a nonlinear long-term relationship. 
An alternative approach in these cases would be to use panel cointegration. Even though these tests might have 
some advantages over time series analysis, they are clearly inappropriate to study the cross-country differences 
in the interest rate pass-through we are interested in. 
16Stationarity of the residuals is checked for the long-run coefficients obtained from a simple OLS regression and 
from DOLS estimations. 
17These results are not explicitly reported in the paper owing to space constraints. However, they are available 
from the authors upon request. The shaded cells in tables 2a and 2b indicate the presence of cointegration, while 
white cells show that the tests failed to establish cointegration. 
18These results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.   9
these cases, the size of the pass-through is obtained using the DOLS and ARDL models. 
Otherwise, we used coefficient estimates from a simple OLS run for first-differenced 
variables (see tables 2a and 2b). It turns out that, even though the cointegration tests failed to 
detect long-run relationships between the policy rate and a number of interest rates, the 
coefficient estimates obtained for series taken in first differences provided us with an 
opportunity to estimate the pass-through coefficient after all, as they are very often significant 
and have the expected positive sign. 
Let us start with the connection between the policy rate and short- to long-term market rates. 
It comes as no real surprise that the pass-through from the policy rate to 1m MMR is not 
significantly different from 1 for practically all countries and periods.  
The pass-through to the long-term market rate (government bonds) drops from high levels in 
the first subperiod to between 40% and 50% in the second subperiod in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary and becomes insignificant for Poland. For transition economies, this is to be 
expected since the yield curve at the longer end changed considerably for these economies 
owing to successful attempts to decrease in inflation rates
19. 
With regard to deposit rates, our results demonstrate that the pass-through for overnight (O/N) 
deposit rates ranges from 10% in Hungary to between 15% and 25% in the Czech Republic, 
Austria, Germany and Spain, while coming to between 35% and 55% in Poland and Slovakia 
in the second subperiod. In those countries where sectoral data for O/N deposit rates are 
available (the Czech Republic and Poland), a major difference is found only in Poland (higher 
pass-through for households). 
These figures for the O/N deposit rates are considerably lower than the pass-through 
coefficients of short- to long-term deposit rates in all countries, except for Slovakia and 
Slovenia, where the pass-through coefficients for the latter are not significantly different from 
zero. In addition, and not astonishingly, changes in the policy rate feed into new deposit rates 
to a larger extent than into the rates on outstanding deposits (Hungary). Deposit rates for large 
amounts are more responsive to policy rates than those for small amounts (Germany). The 
pass-through remained fairly stable over time for most countries, with the notable exceptions 
                                            
19For countries which embarked on a prolonged period of disinflation (e.g. Hungary and Poland), the long-term 
market rates declined below the level of short-term rates once the market participants were convinced of the 
steady decrease in inflation rates. However, the negative slope of the yield curve decreased substantially toward 
the end of disinflation, given the limited room for large drops in future inflation rates. Thus, further cuts in 
monetary policy rates could not cause long-term market rates to drop to the same extent. As inflation rates 
stabilized, with disinflation reaching an end, the yield curve eventually flattened out or its slope even became 
positive.   10
of Hungary and Poland, where the pass-through increased for O/N deposit rates (both 
countries) and for household rates (Poland). 
Table 2a: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Market Rates
20 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS
CEE-5 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   MMR  1.08**  1.07**   1.11**  1.08**   1.01**  1.01** C 
   MMR 12  0.95**  0.91** C  0.89**  0.82** C  1.01**  0.95** C 
   G-bond  0.78**  0.64** C  0.65**  0.55**  0.43**     
Hungary     1995:9 / 1997:3 – 2005:12  1995:9 / 1997:3 – 2000:12 2001:1 – 2005:12 
   MMR  0.99**  1.01** C  1.01**  1.01**   1.03**  1.04** C 
   T-bill  0.99**  0.95** C 1.01***      0.88**  0.85**  
   G-bond  0.61***      0.84**  0.97** C 0.48***     
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   MMR  1.05**  1.05** C  1.06**  1.06** B  1.02**  1.02** C 
   T-bill  0.93**  0.90**  0.66***     0.40***     
   G-bond  0.37***      0.46**      0.15     
Slovakia     1994:1 – 2002:12  1998:7 – 2004:12  2001:1 – 2004:12 
   MMR  0.04      0.02      0.84**  0.89** C 
   MMR 12  0.28      -0.14      0.95**  0.94** C 
Notes: Shaded cells refer to the existence of cointegrating relationships and contain the estimated long-run elasticities (DOLS 
and ARDL). Non-shaded cells in the “DOLS/1st d” column report the coefficients obtained from first-differenced 
specifications. The column “AS” shows the type of asymmetry. A: asymmetry in the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, 
B: asymmetry in short-run dynamics, C: both A and B.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. NA=data not available for the period under review. 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at lending rates, which seem to offer us a so far 
unseen colorful picture. In general, lending rates for households turn out to react less, if at all, 
to monetary policy rates as compared with lending rates for the corporate sector. No 
significant or economically meaningful pass-through could be detected for the interest rates 
on aggregate household lending in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on consumer lending in 
Slovakia, on new long-term consumer loans and new housing loans in Hungary. The pass-
through for rates on outstanding housing loans in Hungary is only around 20%. The 
                                            
20The following abbreviations were used for market rates: mp= monetary policy rate, mmr= 1-month money 
market rate; T-bill= 12-month treasury bill rate, mmr12= 12-month money market rate if no T-bill rate is 
available, gbond= government bond rate. 
The information on retail rates is composed of three main blocks (e.g. lhh_l1y_s). The first block indicates the 
type of interest rate: l= lending rate, d= deposit rate, f= non-financial corporate sector (firms) (lf or df), h= 
aggregate household loans (dh, lh), hh= housing loan to households, hc= consumer credit to households. The 
second block denotes the maturity of the series: on= overnight, l1y= less than one year, m1y= more than one 
year, 1m, 3m= one month, three months; 1y, 3y, 4y= one year, three years, four years, 1y5y= 1 to 5 years, st= 
short-term, lt= long-term (if the source does not specify the precise maturity). No indication of maturity means 
that the series covers all maturities. The third block covers two types of information: (1) It may be n or s (n= new 
loans or deposits; s= stock of deposits or loans). A missing n or s at the end of the label indicates aggregated data 
for new and old loans (deposits) or simply reflects the lack of specification by the data source. (2) For German 
deposit rates, a difference is made between interest rates for low-, medium- and high-amount deposits: la, ma, ha 
(e.g. d_1m_la, d_1m_ma, d_1m_ha). For Austria, a similar type of information is included in the second block: 
e.g. lf_l1y1M_n refers to the rates for corporate loans exceeding EUR 1 million, while lf_l1y_n stands for the 
same type of loan below or equal to EUR 1 million.   11
insensitivity of housing loan rates may reflect the impact of public subsidy schemes in 
Hungary. By contrast, the pass-through for housing loan rates in Slovenia is almost complete. 
Table 2b: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Deposit Rates 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS
Overall deposits 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   d_on_s  0      0      0.20***     
   d_l1y_s  0.79**  0.74** C  0.74**  0.66**   0.80**  0.79** C 
   d_lt_s  0.71**  0.6**  C  0.68**  0.57** C 0.59***     
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   d_on_n  0.39***      NA  NA  NA 0.40***     
Slovakia     1994:1 – 2002:12  1998:7 – 2004:12  2001:1 – 2004:12 
   d_on_s  NA  NA  NA 0.06      0.33**  0.33** B 
   d_l1y  0.14      0.22      0.3     
Slovenia     1994:1 – 2002:8  1998:7 – 2005:11  2001:1 – 2005:11 
   d_on_n  NA  NA  NA 0.00      0.00     
   d_l1y  2.32**  1.57*             
   d_m1y  NA  NA  NA 0.04      0.10     
Household deposits 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   dh_on_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.16***     
   dh_lt_s NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.50**  0.42** C 
Hungary     1995:1 – 2005:12  1995:1 – 2000:12  2001:1 / 2001:5 – 2005:12
   dh_on_n  0.05      0.01      0.11**     
   dh_on_s 0.16***      0.08*     0.12**     
   dh_l1y_n  0.77**  0.81** C  0.90**  0.85**  0.73***     
   dh_l1y_s NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.53***    
   dh_m1y_n  0.92**  0.91** C  0.95**  0.93**  0.52***     
   dh_m2y_n NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.59***    
   dh_m2y_s NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.33***    
   dh_lt_n  0.78**  0.81** C  0.90**  0.86**  0.72***     
   dh_lt_s  0.78**  0.81** C  0.92**  0.86**  0.52***     
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   dh_on_s 0.34***      0.32***     0.57**  0.46** C 
   dh_1y_s 0.74***      0.70***     0.82**  0.77** C 
   dh_m1y_s  0.92**  0.92**  0.74***     0.77***     
   dh_lt_s 0.71***    0.70***    0.82**  0.77**  
Corporate deposits 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   df_on_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.15**     
   df_lt_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.61***     
Hungary     1995:1 – 2005:12  1995:1 – 2000:12  2001:1 / 2001:5 – 2005:12
   df_l1y_n  0.81**  0.80**   0.89**  0.87**  0.95***     
   df_m1y_n  0.91**  0.90** A  0.95**  0.92**   0.81**  0.81** C 
   df_lt_n  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.95***     
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   df_on_s  0.22***      0.17***      0.33***     
   df_1y_s 0.71***     0.72***     0.69***    
   df_m1y_s  0.89**  0.90**  0.62***     0.61***     
   df_lt_s  0.87**  0.87** A 0.69***      0.88**  0.79**  
Note: See Table 2a. 
The pass-through amounts to above 70% for consumer loan rates in Slovenia. In Hungary, it 
comes to almost 60% for new short-term consumer loans and to roughly 40% for the stock of 
these loans). This is in sharp contrast with the finding that the pass-through is zero for new   12
long-term consumer loans in Hungary. Only in Slovenia did the size of the coefficient 
increase. 
Table 2c: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Lending Rates 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL  AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL  AS
Overall lending rates 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   l_l1y_s  –0.07**      –0.07      0.66***     
   l_1y5y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.25     
Lending rates for household 
Czech Rep.  Lh_l1y_s  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.75     
   Lh_1y5y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.07     
   Lh_m5y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.08     
Hungary     1995:1 / 1997:1 – 2005:12  1995:1 / 1997:1 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   lhc_l1y_n  0.42**  0.42** C  0.55**  0.55**    0.57**  0.66**  C 
   lhc_l1y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.38***     
   lhc_m1y_n  0.24      0.60**  0.57**   0.29    
   lhc_m1y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.24***     
   lhh_n  0.07      1.00**  1.11**   0.19    
   lhh_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.16**     
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   Lh_n  0.63***      NA  NA  NA 0.43***     
Slovakia     1994:1 – 2002:12  1998:7 – 2004:12  2001:1 – 2004:12 
 Lh_s  NA  NA  NA –0.06**  –0.06   –0.03     
 Lh_n  NA  NA  NA –0.57**  –0.60**   –0.55**  –0.57**  
    lhc_s  NA  NA  NA –0.41     –0.53    
   lhc_n  NA  NA  NA –0.29**  –0.24    –0.25*  –0.26   
   lhc  NA  NA  NA –0.53      –1.39**  –1.50**  
Slovenia     1994:1 – 2002:8  1998:7 – 2005:11  2001:1 – 2005:11 
   lhc  0.92*      0.06      0.76**  0.72**   
   lhh  0.86*      0.19      1.14**  1.12**  B 
Lending rates for the non-financial corporate sector 
Czech Rep.     1995:12 – 2005:12  1995:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   lf_l1y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.87**  0.86**   
   lf_1y5y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.98**  1.02**   
   lf_m5y_s  NA  NA  NA NA  NA  NA 0.25     
Hungary     1995:1 – 2005:12  1995:1 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   lf_l1y_n  1.01**  1.00** C 0.35***      0.96**  0.96**  C 
   lf_m1y_n  1.01**  0.97**   1.09**  1.07**  A  0.72**  0.72**   
Poland     1996:12 / 1998:7 – 2005:12 1996:12 – 2000:12  2001:1 – 2005:12 
   lf_l1y_n  0.83***      NA  NA  NA 0.50***     
   lf_m1y_n  0.78***      NA  NA  NA 0.45***     
   lf_3y_s 0.74***     0.87***    0.47***    
   lf_n 0.79***      NA  NA  NA 0.54***     
Slovakia     1994:1 – 2002:12  1998:7 – 2004:12  2001:1 – 2004:12 
   lf_l1y  0.28      1.04**  0.93**    0.73**  0.82**   
   lf_m1y  0.49      0.92      0.99**  1.03**  B 
   lf_s  NA  NA  NA 0.72**  0.89**   0.15    
   lf_n  NA  NA  NA 0.56      1.01**  1.03**   
Slovenia     1994:1 – 2002:8  1998:7 – 2005:11  2001:1 – 2005:11 
    lf_l1y  0.91*      0.13     0.15    
   lf_m1y 0.96*     0.25     1.27**  1.28**   
Note: See Table 2a. 
Corporate loan rates are generally very responsive to monetary policy rate changes, with the 
pass-through estimate ranging from 50% for Poland to 100% for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia (with the exception of short-term rates). Nevertheless, these   13
results should be taken with some qualification. First, the pass-through for short-term 
corporate loan rates in Hungary seems to be more pronounced than for long-term corporate 
loan rates while the opposite holds true in Slovakia and to some extent also in the Czech 
Republic and in Slovenia. Second, while the pass-through is complete for the rates on new 
loans, it vanishes completely for the rates on the outstanding stock of loans in Slovakia. 
Finally, no clear-cut statement can be made about the temporal evolution of the pass-through 
for corporate rates. For instance, it diminished for long-term lending rates in Hungary and 
increased for short-term lending rates. In Slovakia and Slovenia, pass-through for long-term 
rates became significant in the second subperiod. By contrast, the pass-through coefficients of 
corporate lending rates (all maturities) in Poland were lower in the second period compared 
with the first and/or the whole period. 
 
5.3 The Pass-Through to Retail Rates via Market Rates 
For the multivariate cointegrated VAR setting, we select countries in accordance with a 
twofold criterion. First, at least 12m MMR/T-bill rates and retail rates should be connected to 
the policy rate through a cointegrating vector obtained from the single equation analysis. 
Second, both deposit and lending rates of comparable maturity should pass the cointegration 
criterion with positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates. The two countries 
which qualify in terms of these two criteria are the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
For the Czech Republic, only the second subperiod is analyzed, given that cointegration for 
lending rates is found only in the period 2001–2005. The selected retail rates are lending rates 
for the non-financial corporate sector with a maturity of less than 1 year and 1–5 years and an 
aggregate deposit rate with a maturity of less than 1 year and household deposit rates for 
maturities longer than overnight. This leads us to build a system for short-term deposit and 
lending rates (mp→1mMMR→12mMMR→dep (d_l1y_s)→len(lf_l1y)) and for long-term 
deposit and lending rates (mp→ 1mMMR→ 12mMMR → gbond→ dep(dh_lt_s)→ 
len(lf_1y5y)). 
For the short-term system
21, the trace statistics identifies four cointegration vectors. This 
indicates a fully-fledged pass-through from the monetary policy rate to deposit and lending 
rates. The long-term coefficient, shown in table 3, is close to unity for market rates (1.01 and 
1.05). It is 0.73 for the relation 12m MMR – deposit rate, which is in line with the findings of 
the single-equation approach if accounting for the previous chains (0.75 vs. 
                                            
21The lag length in the VAR is selected using the Schwarz information criterion by setting the maximum number 
of lags to 6 as in the single-equation approach.   14
1.01*1.05*0.73=0.77). The long-run coefficient between deposit and lending rates is as high 
as 1.16. Therefore we think that this coefficient does not capture the relationship between 
deposit and lending rates, but rather reflects the relative size of the pass-through from 12m 
MMR rates to those rates. Indeed, if we specify the fourth cointegration vector as linking 12m 
MMR rates to the lending rates, the estimated coefficient is 0.85, which is higher than the 
coefficient for the relation 12m MMR – deposit rate, thus confirming our earlier results from 
the direct monetary policy approach (0.86–0.87 vs. 1.01*1.05*0.85=0.90). 
In the system of long-term rates with six variables, we detected four cointegration 
relationships. Given that one more variable is included (government bond rates), one chain 
link is not functional. Our earlier results from the single-equation approach implicitly indicate 
the absence of cointegration for the link 12m MMR – government bond yield.
22 The long-run 
coefficients of this system reported in table 3 confirm an almost one-to-one reaction of the 
lending rates to 12m MMR. 
For Hungary, only a five-variable system excluding government bond rates is estimated since 
we did not find cointegration between the policy rate and government bond yields. The two 
systems estimated for consumer loan rates and corporate lending rates provide evidence of a 
fully-fledged transmission from the policy rate through 1m MMR and 12m T-bill rates to 
deposit rates (new long-term corporate deposit rates) and lending rates (new short-term 
consumer lending rates and new long-term corporate lending rates). The results furthermore 
confirm the findings of the single-equation estimations which show a very strong pass-
through to long-term deposit rates and indicate that the pass-through is higher for (long-term) 
corporate loan rates than for (short-term) consumer loan rates, even though the former 
becomes weaker, while the latter rises slightly over time. 
                                            
22The pass-through from the policy rate to the 12m MMR is almost complete, while no cointegration could be 
detected between the monetary policy rate and government bond yields for the second subperiod. This implies a 
lack of cointegration between 12m MMR and government bond yields.   15
Table 3: Multivariate Analysis - Results 
   COINT  MP→1mMMR 1mMMR→12mMMR 12mMMR→GBOND 12mMMR→DEP DEP→LEN 12mMMR→LEN
Czech Republic 
MP→1m MMR→12m MMR→DEP (D_L1Y_S)→LEN (LF_L1Y) 
2001:1 – 2005:12  4**  1.01**  1.05**     0.73**  1.16**    
K=1  4**  1.01**  1.05**     0.73**     0.85** 
MP→1m MMR→12m MMR→GBOND→DEP (DH_LT_S)→LEN (LF_1Y5Y) 
2001:1 – 2005:12  4** 1.01**  0.92**  --  0.56**  1.84**     
K=1  4** 1.01**  0.92**  --  0.56**      1.03** 
Hungary 
MP→1m MMR→12m TBILL→DEP (DF_M1Y_N)→LEN (LHC_L1Y_N) 
1997:3 – 2005:12  4**  1.02**  0.98**     0.93**  0.42**    
K=1  4**  1.01**  0.98**     0.93**     0.39** 
2001:1 – 2005:12  4**  1.02**  0.85**     0.99**  0.72**    
K=1  4**  1.02**  0.85**     0.99**     0.72** 
MP→1m MMR→12m TBILL→DEP (DF_M1Y_N)→LEN (LF_M1Y_N) 
1997:3 – 2005:12  4**  1.01**  0.98**     0.93**  1.06**    
K=2  4**  1.02**  0.98**     0.94**     0.99* 
2001:1 – 2005:12  4**  1.02**  0.85**     0.99**  0.84**    
K=2  4**  1.02**  0.85**     0.99**     0.83** 
Notes: k=1 or k=2 indicates the lag length chosen by the Schwarz information criterion. COINT shows the number of 
cointegrating vectors detected by the trace statistic. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
5.4 Comparison with Previous Estimates and with the 
Euro Area 
Our results confirm earlier findings in the literature that the pass-through is generally very 
low for overnight deposit rates, but becomes substantially higher for short- to long-term 
deposit rates. At the same time, corporate lending rates are much more responsive to changes 
in the policy rate than deposit or household loan rates. 
However, several prominent differences between our results and the existing estimates catch 
one’s eyes.
23 First, our estimates indicate a lower pass-through for overnight and long-term 
household deposit rates in Hungary, a moderately lower pass-through for all kinds of deposit 
rates in Poland, a moderately lower pass-through for long-term corporate loan rates in 
Hungary and for short-term and long-term corporate loan rates in Poland. Second, our 
estimations fail to establish any significant relationship between monetary policy rates on the 
one hand, and deposit rates in Slovakia, as well as aggregate household loan rates (and 
consumer loan rates) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on the other hand. 
One key reason for these differences is that most of the existing literature estimates error 
correction models without checking the existence of a valid cointegration  relationship. 
However, a number of series are not cointegrated with policy rates. The estimated coefficients 
we derived by using regressions applied to first differenced series tend to be lower than those 
                                            
23 Égert and MacDonald (2006) provide an overview on interest rate pass-through estimates in transition 
economies.   16
resulting from the cointegration analysis (which was inappropriate in the given context). 
Another possible explanation for our lower estimates is a possible decrease in the pass-
through over time, given that our data sample covers more recent periods. 
While other papers identify no major asymmetries for the CEE-5, our results indicate that the 
reaction of retail and market rates becomes increasingly asymmetric depending on the 
direction of changes in the policy rate. However, it was not possible to make out a general 
pattern for this asymmetric behavior for specific interest rates (except, perhaps, for short-term 
money market rates). 
Our results obtained for selected euro area countries, namely Austria, Germany and Spain
2425 
are partly in line with earlier findings as the pass-through appears to be lower in Austria and 
in Germany than in the CEE-5. Nevertheless, the interest rate pass-through in the CEE-5 are 
more comparable with those in Spain than with those in the other euro area countries. 
6 Future Evolution of the Interest Rate Pass-Through 
A number of researchers have attempted to identify the factors affecting the size and speed of 
the pass-through in transition economies. This literature suggests that banking sector 
characteristics have an important role to play in the size of the pass-through. In particular, 
higher concentration of the banking sector, if it proxies lower competition, higher profitability 
and higher capitalization of banks typically make banks less receptive to adjusting their retail 
rates to market or policy rates, and hence dampen the interest rate pass-through. At the same 
time, the ownership structure, especially the involvement of foreigners in the banking sector, 
may enhance the interest rate pass-through. These findings are contradictory given that 
foreign participation usually leads to higher concentration and that foreign-owned banks tend 
to be more profitable and better capitalized. However, this contradiction could be explained 
by the argument that foreign participation increased efficiency and competition during the 
early stages of privatization while it led to a consolidation of the banking sector during the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s. In addition, (foreign) banks in the CEE-5 tended to fund their 
lending activity by domestic savings in the 1990s, whereas they were increasingly relying on 
foreign funds during the last 5 years or so, which diminished their sensitivity to changes in 
domestic policy rates. 
                                            
24 Austria, Germany and Spain represent small open economies, large core countries and catching-up countries, 
respectively. 
25 These results are reported in Appendix B.   17
The empirical evidence is thus far mixed regarding the role of macroeconomic conditions in 
the pass-through. For instance, GDP growth and financial deepening do not seem to affect the 
pass-through, while lower inflation and higher money market volatility are found to decrease 
the pass-through. 
Against this backdrop, we can draw some speculative conclusions about the future evolution 
of the pass-through from the possible development of the factors driving the pass-through. 
From a macro-perspective, money market volatility is bound to fall to euro area levels after 
euro adoption, and financial depth is likely to rise in the years to come. At the same time, 
inflation rates will tend to close the gap to the inflation rate of the euro area, and long-run 
GDP growth may slow down as real convergence progresses. The first two factors will work 
toward an increase in the pass-through while the other two factors could dampen it. Looking 
at the structure of the banking sector, Poland and Slovenia have fewer foreign investors, 
partly because of slower banking sector reform. Poland and Slovenia are also the countries 
with the highest burden of nonperforming loans, and Slovenia has the lowest capital adequacy 
ratio, albeit still comparable to that of the euro area. All this is admittedly detrimental to the 
pass-through. So, by making efforts on the front of banking reforms, these countries would be 
able to enhance the interest rate pass-through. However, market concentration has recently 
been on the rise in most of these countries. Concentration measured by the Herfindahl index is 
well above the euro area level in Slovenia, but also in Slovakia, while concentration is 
considerably lower in Hungary and Poland. Given that market concentration is still on the 
rise, the interest rate pass-through may slow down and become less complete in the future in 
these countries if increasing concentration will be associated with less competition.   18
Table 4. Factors amplifying or attenuating the interest rate pass-through 
  CZ HU PL SK  SI 
MACROECONOMY  (2004)       
Inflation  (%)  2.6 6.8 3.6 7.5 3.7 
Money market volatility   0.75 1.92 1.88 1.37  1.23 
GDP growth  (%)  4.4  4.6  5.3  5.5  4.2 
Financial depth: Private credit to GDP
a  0.30 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.39 
BANKING  SECTOR       
Concentration - Herfindahl index  1103 795 692 1154  1425 
                        - 5 largest banks (in total assets%) 64.0 52.7 50.2 66.5  64.1 
Foreign banks  - Change in number 1995-2003  3  8  28  -2  0 
                        - % in total assets in 2003  96.0 83.3 67.8 96.3  36.0 
State ownership (% in total)   1995  17.6 49  71.7 61.2  41.7 
                                              2003  3.0  7.4  25.7 1.5  12.8 
Bad loans (% in total)   1995  26.6 na  23.9 41.3  9.3 
                                     2003  5.0  3.8  25.1 9.1  9.4 
Note: In the euro area, the Herfindahl index was 966 in the year 2004. 
Source: Inflation and GDP growth: Eurostat/NewCronos, money market volatility is based on the relative standard deviation 
of monthly observations for 1-month money market interest rates from 2002 to 2004. Private credit to GDP: World Bank 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2005, banking sector concentration: ECB (2005): EU Banking Structures, October, WDI 
2005. Data on foreign banks, state ownership and bad loans are obtained from the EBRD Transition Report (2004). 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we analyzed the size of the interest rate pass-through for five CEE countries. 
Our results confirm earlier findings in the literature that the pass-through is generally very 
low for overnight deposit rates, but becomes substantially higher for short- to long-term 
deposit rates and corporate lending rates are much more responsive to changes in the policy 
rate than deposit or household loan rates. Our findings also support the view that the pass-
through is on average higher in the CEE-5 than in core euro area countries, like Austria and 
Germany. 
At the same time, our results enrich our understanding of the interest rate pass-through in 
various ways. First, our pass-through estimates for the CEE-5 tend to be lower for a number 
of retail rates than those of previous estimates. This is primarily attributable to the fact that 
while previous studies have chiefly relied on error correction models without explicitly 
checking the presence of cointegrating relationships between the policy and retail rates, we 
found it difficult to establish cointegration and pass-through estimates obtained for first 
differenced stationary series are lower than for data in level. In addition, we failed to detect 
significant pass-through effects in a number of cases, in particular in Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Second, we found little empirical support for a functioning pass-through to long-term market 
rates, presumably owing to the instability of the yield curve at the longer end of the maturity 
spectrum. Instead, the effect of changes in the key policy rate even transits through money 
market and T-bill rates to long-term deposit and lending rates.   19
The interest rate pass-through improved substantially from the beginning of transition until 
around the early 2000s mostly because of the impressive development of the financial and 
banking sectors in these countries. However, our results indicate a reversal of this trend. Our 
lower pass-through estimates suggest that pass-through is declining over time, as our data is 
from a more recent period. This is also backed by direct econometric evidence. Elements of 
an explanation for the weakening of the pass-through could be the substantial slowdown in 
inflation rates on the macro side and less competition among banks and more reliance on 
foreign funds for lending activity on the micro side. 
We argued that the slowdown in the pass-through might continue in the future given that a 
progressive slowdown in economic growth as real convergence advances and, perhaps more 
importantly, increasingly concentrated banking sectors will cause the pass-through to slow 
down even though bringing to an end banking sector privatization and liberalization in some 
of the countries (Poland and Slovenia) could enhance the pass-through for some time. 
Although the interest rate pass-through in the CEE-5 is higher than in core euro area 
countries, it is fairly comparable with that in Spain. The possible future decrease in the pass-
through in the CEE-5 further underpins the view that the euro area will presumably not 
become more heterogeneous with respect to the interest rate pass-through once the CEE-5 
will have adopted the euro in the longer run. 
In the shorter run, however, asymmetries may prevail. This question is of particular relevance 
for Slovenia, which will become a full member of the euro area on January 1, 2007. In 
Slovenia, the interest rate pass-through shows a rather fuzzy pattern given that no tangible 
pass-through could be detected for deposit rates and long-term corporate loans, while a very 
strong pass-through emerges for household loan and short-term corporate loan rates. This 
could imply not only that changes in the ECB’s policy rate will have asymmetric effects on 
deposit and loans within Slovenia, but also that these effects will be different than in the rest 
of the euro area. 
However good and reassuring the news about a possible longer-run convergence in the size of 
the pass-through across Eastern and Western Europe might be, it gives barely any clue 
regarding a possible convergence or similarities in the second stage of the monetary 
transmission mechanism (including the money, credit, asset price and exchange rate 
channels), i.e. whether monetary policy steps would achieve similar impact on prices and 
output in the euro area than in the CEE-5 in the event that they would introduce the euro. The   20
literature dealing with this question is still in its infancy and substantially more work will be 
needed to answer these issues. 
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Appendix A – Data Definitions 
Our dataset covers the CEE-5 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
and three euro area countries (Austria, Germany and Spain). The monthly data series include 
short-term market rates, i.e. (annualized) 1-month money market rates (MMR), and 12-month 
T-bill rates (if not available, 12-month MMR), long-term market rates, i.e. 3- to 5-year 
government bond yields, as well as economy-wide and sectoral retail rates (households and 
non-financial corporate sector) of different maturity (overnight rates, short- and long-term 
rates). For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Germany, these data are 
primarily obtained from the national central banks and the ministries of finance. For Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain, the main data source is NewCronos (Eurostat). Some of the market rates 
are drawn from Datastream and Bloomberg, if not available from national sources or from 
Eurostat. Whenever possible, the lending rate series for households are split into housing and 
consumer loans. The time series start in January 1994 at the earliest for the CEE-5 and usually 
end in end-2005. 
Furthermore, we distinguished between retail rates on the stock of deposits/loans and those 
applied to newly collected deposits/newly extended loans. This is important because the 
(weighted) average interest rates on outstanding deposits and loans (which include contracts 
with fixed rates and contracts with variable rates that are adjusted at a later stage) may react 
more slowly than the interest rates of new deposits and loans. The maturity of the series is 
another important issue. In conventional interest rate statistics, maturity refers to the duration 
of the loan or deposit contract, not to the period of interest rate fixation. In the new 
harmonized interest statistics developed in the euro area and in new EU Member States, 
however, maturity refers to the period of interest rate fixation. However, most of those series 
start as late as 2003, with the exception of the lending rate time series for Austria. 
We constructed another database that includes interest rate series obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS): discount rates (line 
60), money market rates (line 60b), T-bill rates (line 60c), deposit rates (line 60l), lending 
rates (line 60p) and government bond yields (line 61). The series usually cover the period 
1991–2005. They are constructed using data series compiled on the basis of different 
methodologies (which explains their length for transition economies) and do not distinguish   22
between different maturities.
26 Hence, it is interesting to see whether or not the results differ 
for our two datasets. 
Czech Republic:  Data series are obtained from the Czech National Bank if not indicated otherwise (in 
parentheses).  
1995:12 – 2005:12 mp (2-week repo rate), mmr (Datastream 1995:12-96:12, Bloomberg thereafter), mmr12 
(Datastream, PRIBK1Y), d_on_s, d_lt_s, d_l1y_s, l_l1y_s 
1997:2-2005:12 gbond (Bloomberg) 
2001:1 – 2005:12 dh_on_s, dh_lt_s, df_on_s, df_lt_s, l_1y5y_s, lh_l1y_s, lh_1y5y_s, lh_m5y_s, lf_l1y_s, 
lf_1y5y_s, lf_m5y_s. 
Hungary: Data series are obtained from the National Bank of Hungary if not indicated otherwise (in 
parentheses). 
1995:1- 2005:12 mp (active overnight repo rate until 1995:12, passive 1-month repo rate from 1996:12 to 
1999:2, 2-week deposit rate thereafter), dh_on_n, dh_on_s, dh_lt_n, dh_lt_s, dh_l1y_n, dh_m1y_n, df_l1y_n, 
df_m1y_n, lhh_n, lf_l1y_n, lf_m1y_n 
1995:9 – 2005:12 mmr (Datastream 1995:9–1996:7, Bloomberg thereafter) 
1997:1 – 2005:12 lhc_l1y_n, lhc_m1y_n 
1997:3 – 2005:12 tbill, gbond 
2000:1 – 2005:12 df_lt_n, lhc_l1y_s, lhc_m1y_s, lhh_s 
2001:5 – 2005:12 dh_l1y_s, dh_m2y_n, dh_m2y_s 
Poland: Data series are obtained from the National Bank of Poland if not indicated otherwise (in parentheses). 
1994:2 – 2005:11 mp (1994:2–1994:3 rediscount rate; thereafter short-term NBP bills: “intervention rate”), mmr 
(Datastream 1994:2–1996:8, Bloomberg thereafter), tbill (Ministry of Finance), gbond (Ministry of Finance, 
Bloomberg thereafter) 
1996:12 – 2005:11 dh_on_s, dh_lt_s, dh_1y_s, dh_m1y_s, df_on_s, df_lt_s, df_1y_s, df_m1y_s, lf_3y_s 
Data series are obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat: 
1998:07 – 2005:11 lh_n, lf_l1y_n, lf_m1y_n, lf_n, d_on_n 
Slovakia: The data series are obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat if not indicated otherwise (in parentheses). 
1994:1 – 2005:12 mp (NewCronos: other official rates until 2000:1; official refinancing operation rate 
thereafter; cross-checked with National Bank of Slovakia data), mmr (National Bank of Slovakia via Datastream: 
SXIBK1M; cross-checked with NewCronos data) 
1994:9 – 2005:12 mmr12 (National Bank of Slovakia via Datastream: SXIBK1Y) 
1994:1 – 2002:12 d_l1y, d_m1y, lf_l1y, lf_m1y 
1998:7 – 2004:12 lf_l1y_s, lf_l1y_n, lf_m1y_s, lf_s, lf_n, lhc_s, lhc_n, lhc, lh_s, lh_n, d_on_s 
Slovenia: The data series are obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat if not indicated otherwise (in parentheses). 
1994:1 – 2005:11 mp (NewCronos: official lending rate) 
1994:1 – 2002:08 lf_l1y, lf_m1y, lhc, lhh, d_l1y, 
1998:7 – 2005:11 lf_l1y_n, lf_m1y_n. lhc_n. lhh_n. d_on_n. d_m1y.  
Germany: The data series are obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank if not indicated otherwise (in 
parentheses). 
1992:11 – 2005:12 mp (NewCronos: official refinancing operation rates, Deutsche Bundesbank until 1998:12, 
European Central Bank after 1999:1), mmr, mmr12, gbond (4-5-year government bond) 
1991:1 – 2003:6 lh_lt, lhh_5y, lhh_10y, lhh, lhc, lhh, lf_st_5, lf_st_25, lf_2y, lf_l1y, d_1m_la, _1m_ma, 
d_1m_ha, d_4y, d_l1y,  
                                            
26The IFS manual remains very vague about the exact definition of the series e.g. regarding maturity.   23
1996:11 – 2003:6 lf_st_1, lh_st, lf_m1y, dh_on, d_3m, lf_la, lf_ha, lh_st 
Spain: The data series are obtained from NewCronos/Eurostat if not indicated otherwise (in parentheses). 
1992:11 – 2003:6 mp (NewCronos: official refinancing operation rates, Bank of Spain until 1998:12, European 
Central Bank after 1999:1), mmr (Datastream: ESMIB1M), mmr12 (Datastream: ESMIB1Y), gbond (5-year 
swap, Datastream: ICESP5Y), lf_l1y, lf_m1y, lh, lhh, d_on, d_l1y, d_other, 
Austria: The data series are obtained from the Oesterreichische Nationalbank if not indicated otherwise (in 
parentheses). 
1995:12 – 2005:11 mp (NewCronos: official refinancing operation rates, Oesterreichische Nationalbank until 
1998:12, European Central Bank after 1999:1), mmr (Bloomberg), mmr12 (Bloomberg), gbond (Bloomberg), 
dh_on_s, dh_l1y_n, dh_m2y_n, df_on_s, df_l1y_n, df_m2y_n, lhh_l1y_n, lhh_1y5y_n 
1999:6 – 2005:11 lf_l1y_n, lf_1y5y_n, lf_l1y1M_n, lhc_l1y_n, lhc_1y5y_n 
   24
Appendix B - Estimation Results for Selected Euro Area 
Countries 
Table B1: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Market Rates 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL  AS
Austria     1996:6 – 2005:11    1999:1 / 1999:6 – 2005:11
   MMR  0.66***      NA  NA  NA 1.01**  0.99**  C 
   MMR 12  0.44***      NA  NA  NA 0.36***     
   G-bond  0.20*      NA  NA  NA 0.14     
Germany     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:12  1999:1 – 2003:6 
   MMR  1.01**  1.00**   1.00**  1.00** C  1.00**  0.98**  C 
   MMR 12  0.49***      0.68***      0.35***     
    G-bond 0.18*    0.31*     0.07    
Spain     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:6  1999:1 – 2003:6 
   MMR  1.03**  1.02** C  1.04**  1.01** C  0.98**  0.96**   
   MMR 12  0.38***      0.35**      0.31*     
   Swap 5y  0.31**      0.29*      0.07     
Notes: Shaded cells refer to the existence of cointegrating relationships and contain the estimated long-run elasticities (DOLS 
and ARDL). Non-shaded cells in the “DOLS/1st d” column report the coefficients obtained from first-differenced 
specifications. The AS column shows the type of asymmetry. A: asymmetry in the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, B: 
asymmetry in short-run dynamics, C: both A and B.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. NA=data not available for the period under review. 
 
Table B2: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Deposit Rates 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS
Overall deposits 
Germany     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:12  1999:1 – 2003:6 
   d_1m_la  0.42***      0.75**  0.73**  0.43***     
   d_1m_ma  0.46***      0.81**  0.80**   0.80**  0.79**  C 
   d_1m_ha  0.90**  0.91** C  0.90**  0.89** B  0.88**  0.87**   
    d_3m  NA  NA NA NA  NA NA 0.46***     
   d_l1y  0.83**  0.83** C  0.83**  0.83**  0.46***     
    d_4y  0.29***    0.27**     0.29***   
Spain     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:6  1999:1 – 2003:6 
    d_on  0.14**     0.09**     0.20***     
   d_l1y  0.97**  0.91**   0.32***    0.41***    
   d_other  0.74**  0.69** C  0.75**  0.77** C 0.32***     
Household deposits 
Austria     1996:6 – 2005:11    1999:1/ 1999:6 – 2005:11
   dh_on_s  0.13***      NA  NA  NA 0.23**  0.21**   
    dh_l1y_n  0.33***    NA NA  NA 0.36***    
   dh_m2y_n  0.30***      NA  NA  NA 0.58**  0.61**   
Germany     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:12  1999:1 – 2003:6 
    dh_on  NA  NA NA NA  NA NA 0.22***     
Corporate deposits 
Austria     1996:6 – 2005:11    1999:1/ 1999:6 – 2005:11
   df_on_s  0.15***      NA  NA  NA 0.25**  0.22**   
   df_l1y_n  0.23***    NA NA  NA 0.24***    
   df_m2y_n  0.42**  0.43**  NA NA  NA 0.39**  0.39**   
Note: See Table 2a.   25
 
Table B3: Interest Rate Pass-Through – Lending Rates 
      Whole period  1st subperiod  2nd subperiod 
      DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS DOLS/1st d ARDL AS DOLS/1st d  ARDL AS
Lending rates for household 
Austria     1996:6 – 2005:11    1999:1 / 1999:6 – 2005:11
    lhc_l1y_n NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.25***    
    lhc_1y5y_n  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 1.02**  1.04**  
   lhh_l1y_n  0.20***      NA  NA  NA 0.19***     
   lhh_5yn  0.20***      NA  NA  NA 0.20***     
Germany     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:12  1999:1 – 2003:6 
    lh_st  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.18***    
    lh_lt  0.19***    0.19***    0.14***    
    lhc  0.19***    0.19***    0.14***    
   lhh  0.18**      0.22      0.14     
   lhh_5y  0.18**      0.22      0.14     
    lhh_10y 0.07     0.02     0.06    
Spain     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:6  1999:1 – 2003:6 
   lh  1.24**  1.19**   1.29**  1.26**   0.60**  0.60**  
   lhh  1.19**  0.95**   1.24**  1.41**   0.65**  0.68** C 
Lending rates for the non-financial corporate sector 
   lf_m1y 0.96*      0.25      1.27**  1.28**  
Austria     1996:6 – 2005:11    1999:1 / 1999:6 – 2005:11
    lf_l1y_n  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.42***    
    lf_1y5y_n NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.27**    
    lf_l1y1M_n  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.55***    
Germany     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:12  1999:1 – 2003:6 
    lf_la  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.14     
    lf_ha  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.13     
    lf_st_1  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.19***    
    lf_st_5  0.28***    0.27***    0.24***    
    lf_st_25 0.28***    0.33***    0.20***    
    lf_l1y  0.28***    0.33***    0.20***    
    lf_2y  0.30***    0.39***    0.22**     
   lf_m1y  NA NA  NA NA NA  NA 0.13     
Spain     1992:11 – 2003:6  1992:11 – 1998:6  1999:1 – 2003:6 
    lf_l1y  0.68***    0.70***    0.88**  0.76** C 
    lf_m1y  0.37***    0.36***    0.73**  0.70** C 
Note: See Table 2a. 
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